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CHOICE OF LAW IN MICHIGAN: JUDICIAL
METHOD AND THE POLICY-CENTERED
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ROBERT A. SEDLERI
INTRODUCTION
I have long been interested in the relationship between approaches
to choice of law and the process by which a court decides a case
presenting a choice of law issue. Academic commentators generally
tend to focus on the preferred approach to the resolution of choice of
law issues, I and the choice of law "revolution" in this country has pur-
portedly developed in the context of the courts abandoning the "tradi-
tional" approach of state-selecting rules in favor of one of the various
"modem" approaches to choice of law. 2 I maintain that the matter of
the preferred approach to choice of law must be distinguished from
the process by which a court resolves choice of law issues. The process
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University; B.A., 1956, J.D., 1959, University
of Pittsburgh.
1. For a review of "modem" approaches to choice of law, see R. SEDLER & R.
CRAMTON, SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 45-50, 67-75 (2d ed. 1981). For
a representative sampling of the academic debate, see Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-
Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1644 (1981); Kay, The Use of Comparative Im-
pairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 577 (1980); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L.
REv. 315 (1972); Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Con-
stitutional Choice of Law, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 149 (1981); von Mehren, Choice of
Law and the Problem ofjustice, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (Spring 1977). For
the author's view that interest analysis is the preferred approach to the resolution of
choice of law issues, see Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict
of Laws: A Response to the "New Critics," 31 MERCER L. Rav. 1 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference]; Sedler, The Governmental
Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 181 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach].
2. The "traditional" approach, in the context of conflicts torts cases, for ex-
ample, requires the application of the law of the place of the wrong which, in the
event of a car accident, means the law of the place where the accident occurred. On
the other hand, all of the "modem" approaches to choice of law are based to some ex-
tent on considerations of policy and fairness to the parties.
A number of courts have expressly adopted a particular "modem" approach to
choice of law. For a review of the approaches adopted by various courts, see Sedler,
Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts
Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975, 983-1032 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sedler,
Rules of Choice of Law].
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by which a court resolves choice of law issues relates also to the role of
a court in deciding a conflicts case. As I will demonstrate, the role of
the court in a conflicts case is to reach a functionally sound and fair
result in the case before it. A particular approach to choice of law
should be relevant, as far as the process of resolving choice of law
issues is concerned, only insofar as it facilitates the court's perform-
ance of that role. In the present writing, I will focus on the role of a
court in a conflicts case and on the process of resolving choice of law
issues. The recent decision by the Michigan Supreme Court in the
companion cases of Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., and Stone v.
Southfield Leasing, Inc.,3 furnishes a very appropriate vehicle by
which to do so.
I will begin by discussing the proper role of a court in a conflicts
case and the process by which the court should go about resolving
choice of law issues. Then I will discuss the Sexton-Storie decision with
reference to that process. As will be demonstrated, the Michigan
Supreme Court in Sexton-Storie made it clear that future choice of law
issues in Michigan will be resolved by the process which I call judicial
method and the policy-centered conflict of laws. Next I will discuss the
development of choice of law in conflicts torts cases in Michigan in
light of the Sexton-Stone decision and the choice of law process
adopted by the court in that case. Finally, I will conclude with some
observations about the choice of law process adopted in Michigan.
I. THE ROLE OF A COURT IN A CONFLICTS CASE AND THE
CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
There has been considerable academic debate about the proper
role of a court in a conflicts case. That role depends upon the purpose
of conflicts law in our legal system. Sometimes that purpose is seen as
being quite grandiose. According to the Restatement (Second) of the
Conflict of Laws: "Probably the most important function of choice of
law rules is to make the interstate and international systems work well.
Choice of law rules, among other things, should seek to further har-
monious relations between states and to facilitate commercial inter-
course between them."14 It has also been contended that the purpose of
conflicts law is to accommodate the interests of the states that make up
the national and international legal order,5 and to "promote net ag-
gregate long-term common interests."'6
3. 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843 (1982).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment d (1971).
5. See D. CAvERs, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PRocEss 120-24 (1965).
6. McDougal, Comprehensive Interest Analysis Versus Reformulated Govern-
mental Interest Analysis: An Appraisal in the Context of Ghoice-of-Law Problems
Concerning Contributory and Comparative Negligence, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 439,
473 (1979).
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My own view about the purpose of conflicts law is considerably less
grandiose. I see the purpose of conflicts law simply to provide func-
tionally sound and fair solutions for those relatively few cases that arise
in practice where the court has to make a choice of law decision. A
court has to make a choice of law decision only where (1) the case is
connected with more than one state7 and (2) the laws of the involved
states differ on the point in issue.8 Such cases are relatively few in
number for two reasons. First, despite the fact that we live in a
multistate world, most transactions, and thus most cases that arise in
practice, are connected with only one state. Second, even when the
case is connected with more than one state, most of the time the laws
of the involved states will not differ on the point in issue. Therefore,
with few exceptions, conflicts cases arising in American courts are in-
terstate cases,9 and whenever there exists a conflict of laws between
two American states, it is almost invariably because one state has
enacted a statute that changes the common law rule remaining in
force in the other state, 10 or in an area regulated by statute, such as
wrongful death, the statutes of the involved states differ in material
respects.I So, even when a case is connected with more than one state,
7. That is to say that the legally significant facts occurred in more than one
state and/or the parties are not residents of the same state.
8. We generally use the two-state example because almost invariably this is
what is involved in an actual case. In the rare case in which three states are involved,
two of the states' laws on the point in issue usually will be the same. See, e.g., Reich v.
Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). Perhaps unfortunately
for the development of choice of law in Michigan prior to Sexton-Storie, the first case
to present squarely the question of whether Michigan should abandon the traditional
approach to choice of law, Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137
(1969), was a three-state case. See the discussion in Sedler, Choice of Law in
Michigan: A Time to Go Modern, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 829, 830-32 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan].
9. Because most of the conflicts cases coming before American courts are in-
terstate cases, conflicts law in this country developed with reference to the interstate
case. International cases are accommodated within the framework established for in-
terstate cases, although relevant differences may be taken into account by the courts.
10. For example, up until fairly recently, close to half of the states had guest
statutes, so it is not surprising that the great majority of conflicts torts cases in the past
have involved the issue of guest-host immunity. Now, since more states are enacting
comparative negligence statutes or courts are adopting comparative negligence as the
new common law rule, conflicts cases involving the issue of contributory fault are in-
creasing, and this issue appears to be supplanting guest-host immunity as the primary
issue in conflicts torts cases. Furthermore, since most other torts immunities, such as
intra-family immunity, have been abolished or are on the wane, there are relatively
few conflicts cases involving these issues today.
11. In the past, many wrongful death acts imposed a limit on the amount
recoverable, which frequently gave rise to a conflict of laws in wrongful death cases.
Now that practically all of the states have abolished these limits or have substantially
revised them upwards, this fertile source of conflicts litigation has practically disap-
peared.
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usually the case will not present a choice of law issue. Thus, in practice
the number of conflicts cases coming before the courts of a particular
state, and in fact the aggregate number of conflicts cases coming
before all courts, is relatively few.
The conflicts cases that arise in practice are not inherently dif-
ficult to decide. The great majority of these cases are in the torts area,
and for reasons that I have explained elsewhere, 12 the cases tend to fall
into certainfact-law patterns.13 The courts that have abandoned the
traditional approach to choice of law14 have had no difficulty in
deciding these cases, and they have reached fairly uniform results
regardless of the particular "modem" approach to choice of law that
they are purportedly following.15 Conflicts contracts cases also can be
put into certain fact-law patterns, and the cases that arise in practice
tend to involve recurring problems, such as the statute of frauds, built-
in limitations periods, and claims of usury. 16 Conflicts cases in the
property area are exceedingly rare. Thus, not only are there relatively
few conflicts cases that arise in practice, but those that do arise involve
a limited number of choice of law issues, which at least in the torts
area, the courts have resolved in a fairly uniform fashion.
It is precisely because there are relatively few conflicts cases that
arise in practice and precisely because these cases are not inherently
difficult to resolve, that I submit that the purpose of conflicts law and
the role of a court in a conflicts case is to provide functionally sound
and fair solutions to the choice of law issues presented in those cases. 1
7
Therefore, the choice of law process should operate with reference to
the particular case presented for decision and within a framework that
will produce a functionally sound and fair solution in that case.' 8
12. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 980-81.
13. In the torts area, the fact part of the fact-law pattern relates to the states
where the parties reside, the state where the harm occurred, and if it differs, the state
where the act or omission causing the harm occurred. The law part relates to whether
the law in question allows or denies recovery, whether it reflects an admonitory or a
compensatory policy or both, and whether it involves other considerations, such as
those applicable to worker's compensation. Id. at 981.
14. Now that Michigan has joined the states that have abandoned the tradi-
tional approach, at least in torts cases, the breakdown among the 50 states and the
District of Columbia is as follows: abandoned the traditional approach: 31; continue
to adhere to the traditional approach: 14; have not yet passed on the question: 6. See
Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference, supra note 1, at 1-2 n.4.
15. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra
note 2, at 1032-41.
16. Id. at 980 n.29; Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference, supra
note 1, at 6.
17. This point is developed further in Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum
Preference, supra note 1, at 9-13.
18. The problem with any "rules approach" to choice of law, whether it be the
broad, state-selecting approach of the original Restatement, or one of "narrow, policy-
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Some years ago, I set forth an analysis of the choice of law process
in terms of judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws. 9
I maintained that the courts should, in accordance with the common
law tradition, apply judicial method to the resolution of conflicts
problems, as they applied it to other areas of law.20 Under judicial
method, the court would render the choice of law decision with
reference to the fact-law pattern presented in the particular case. The
decision in that case would serve as a precedent for decisions in other
cases, and the decision's rationale would serve as a guide to the resolu-
tion of future cases presenting different fact-law patterns. In time,
depending on the number and kinds of cases that arose in each state, a
body of conflicts law would emerge in that state through the normal
workings of binding precedent and stare decisis. 21
I further maintained that the critieria for the choice of law deci-
sion should be considerations of policy and fairness to the parties. The
rationale here was that the criteria for the choice of law decision-the
decision to displace the forum's own law and to look to the law of
another state in whole or in part for the rule of decision in the
case-should relate to the justification for such displacement. The
forum's law properly should be displaced in a particular case only
where policy considerations, such as recognition of the legitimate in-
terest of another state in having its law govern the transaction, 22 or a
concern for fairness, such as protecting the reasonable expectations of
based rules," see, e.g., Reese, supra note 1; Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-
Law Rules, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 946 (1981), is that built into that kind of approach is
the possibility of unsound results in particular cases, as its proponents readily admit.
Their contention is that the advantages that a rules approach supposedly bring
outweigh the possibility of an "occasional doubtful result." Reese, supra note 1, at
322, 334. This possibility is not built into a choice of law process that operates with
reference to the particular case presented for decision. See the criticism of a "rules ap-
proach" in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 1, at 210-16.
19. Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Babcock
v. Jackson in Kentucky]. For other writings developing this analysis, see Sedler,
Characterization, Identification of the Problem Area, and the Policy-Centered Con-
flict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 RuT.-CAM. L.J. (1970); Sedler,
Judicial Method Is "Alive and Well": The Kentucky Approach to Choice of Law in In-
terstate Automobile Accidents, 61 KY. L.J. 378 (1972-73).
20. See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 19, at 42-45,
57-58.
21. Id. at 82-87.
22. This is the case of the "false conflict," brought in the disinterested state.
Since in this circumstance the forum does not have a real interest in applying its own
law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, while the other involved
state does, the forum should apply the law of the only interested state. In practice, this
is the most common situation where the forum displaces its own law. See Sedler,
Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 1, at 186-87, 223-27; Sedler, Rules of
Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 1034.
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the parties, dictate the displacement of the forum's law in favor of the
law of another state. By limiting the criteria for displacement to the
justification for displacement, the court would be more likely to make
a functionally sound and fair choice of law decision in the particular
case. It was my submission, therefore, that the law of the forum
should be displaced only when considerations of policy or fairness to
the parties required such displacement in the particular case. In the
absence of such considerations, the law of the forum should apply, just
as it would in a domestic case.
Under judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws,
the choice of law process would operate in accordance with the follow-
ing premises: (1) the basic law is the law of the forum, which will be
applied in the absence of valid reasons for its displacement; 23 (2) the
choice of law decision will be made with reference to the fact-law pat-
tern presented in the particular case; and (3) the choice of law deci-
sion will be based on considerations of policy and fairness to the
parties.
The operation of the choice of law process in terms of judicial
method and the policy-centered conflict of laws is analytically distinct
from any particular approach to resolution of choice of law issues. A
court can apply judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of
laws without necessarily adopting any particular approach to choice of
law.24 As we will see, this is precisely what the Michigan Supreme
Court did in Sexton-Storie.25
I would further submit that when we look to the behavior of the
courts in conflicts cases, that is, to the results that they reach in actual
cases, it is clear that the courts which have abandoned the traditional
approach indeed have been applying judicial method and the policy-
centered conflict of laws.26 They have rendered their decisions with
reference to the fact-law pattern presented in the particular case, and
as pointed out previously, at least in the torts area there is relative
agreement among the courts as to how the choice of law issue should
be resolved in each fact-law pattern. This agreement exists not-
withstanding that different courts are purporting to be following dif-
ferent approaches to choice of law. In other words, the results in actual
cases that arise are not likely to differ depending on which particular
23. As to the reasons why the law of the forum is the basic law, see B. CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 75-76 (1963); Sedler, Babcock v.Jackson
in Kentucky, supra note 19, at 87-95.
24. A court, of course, could adopt a particular approach to choice of law if it
concludes that such an approach will best facilitate the operation of judicial method
and the policy-centered conflict of laws.
25. See infra text at notes 58-69.
26. See Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 1032.
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"modern" approach 27 a court is purportedly applying or on whether a
court even commits itself to a particular approach. 28 Moreover, there
seems to be little dispute among the commentators that the courts are
generally reaching functionally sound and fair results29 in the cases
coming before them for decision.30 I submit the reason why they are
reaching functionally sound and fair results is that they are employing
judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws as the basis of
the choice of law process.
I have previously reviewed the practice of the courts in conflicts
torts cases and have demonstrated that what may be called tort rules
of choice of law have emerged from that practice.31 These rules of
choice of law are derived from the results reached by the courts in the
torts cases coming before them, without regard to the particular ap-
proach to choice of law that they may purportedly be applying or the
rationale for their decisions. In some fact-law patterns, the results are
uniform. In others, the courts are divided, but these divisions can be
stated in terms of majority and minority rules.3 2
The most "universal" tort rule of choice of law, followed by all the
courts that have abandoned the traditional approach, is that when
two residents of the forum are involved in an accident in another state,
27. All of the "modern" approaches to choice of law involve to some degree
considerations of policy and fairness to the parties.
28. Professor Leflar maintains that the courts "follow a pattern of multiple
citation, seldom relying solely upon any single modem choice-of-law theory, but com-
bining two or more of the theories to produce results which, interestingly, can be sus-
tained under any or nearly all of the new non-mechanical approaches to conflicts
law." Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well- Watered Plateau, 41 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
10, 10 (Spring 1977).
29. By a "functionally sound and fair result," I mean a result that is acceptable
in the sense that it does not produce unfairness to the litigants in the particular case
and does not require the application of the law of a state in circumstances in which the
application of such law would be considered objectively unreasonable. Courts can
disagree about the result in a particular conflicts case, as they can disagree about the
result in any other case, and there could be more than one outcome in a particular
conflicts case that would be considered to produce a functionally sound and fair result.
30. Again to quote Professor Leflar:
The fact is that most American courts today are moving to what they call
"the" new law of conflict of laws. It is a conglomerate, and not a bad one. In
terms of location, this body of law is being lifted up by the courts to a well-
watered plateau high above the sinkhole it once occupied. No location lasts
forever, and there are vistas beyond the plateau, but it is a rest-stop now.
Leflar, supra note 28, at 26.
The disagreement among academic commentators is over which approach to
choice of law the courts should adopt, and the criticism tends to focus much more on
the rationale of the courts' decisions than on the results of the decisions themselves.
See, e.g., von Mehren, supra note 1.
31. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 2.
32. Id. at 1032.
1983] 1199
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
the law of the forum applies.3 3 Another rule of choice of law is that
when two parties from a recovery state, without regard to forum
residence, are involved in an accident in a non-recovery state, recovery
is allowed.3 4 One situation where the "courts are divided is where two
parties from a non-recovery state are involved in an accident in a
recovery state, and suit is brought in the recovery state. The majority
view here is that the forum should apply its own law allowing
recovery.3 5 Similarly, there have been a number of cases in which a
recovery state plaintiff is injured by a non-recovery state defendant in
the defendant's home state, but it is possible for the plaintiffs home
state to exercise jurisdiction over the case,3 6 and the plaintiff brings
suit there. Here the majority of the courts have held that the forum
should apply its own law allowing recovery.3 7
The rules of choice of law that have emerged from the courts'
decisions in conflicts torts cases illustrate the operation of judicial
method and the policy-centered conflict of laws. While the courts have
purportedly been employing different approaches to the resolution of
choice of law issues, and while they sometimes have advanced different
rationales for their conclusion, they have nonetheless reached substan-
tially the same results. This, I submit, was due to the fact that in each
case the courts were rendering the choice of law decision with
reference to the fact-law pattern presented in that case and were bas-
ing that decision on considerations of policy and fairness to the par-
ties. When later conflicts cases presenting different fact-law patterns
33. Id. at 1033-34.
34. Id. at 1034.
35. Id. at 1035.
36. Either because of sufficient contacts between the defendant and that state,
such as when the defendant is "doing business" in that state, see, e.g., Schwartz v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974), or because of suf-
ficient contacts between the transaction and the forum, such as where the trip giving
rise to an accident in another state originated in the forum and was to end there, see,
e.g., Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
37. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 1036-37. This assumes, of
course, that the application of the forum's law to the out-of-state defendant in the cir-
cumstances presented would not be fundamentally unfair. Ordinarily, in accident
cases, the application of the law of a state other than that where the accident occurred
will not be fundamentally unfair to the defendant, since the defendant did not "rely"
on the law of the accident state before becoming involved in the accident. The ap-
plication of the law of the state imposing liability in an accident case would be unfair
to the defendant only when it was not foreseeable (and hence not insurable) that the
defendant could incur such liability in the circumstances presented, or in the rare case
when a party may have conformed its conduct to the requirements imposed by the law
of a particular state and would not have expected to be held to the higher re-
quirements imposed by the law of another state. Since every state requires that
automobile liability insurance policies must cover the insured driver for accidents oc-
curring in every state, the application of any state's law in an automobile accident case
could not be fundamentally unfair to the driver or the insurer. See R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 271-73 (2d ed. 1980).
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arose in the same state, the courts built on their earlier decisions and
looked to the rationale of those decisions in deciding how to resolve the
choice of law issue now presented. Therefore, in each state that has
abandoned the traditional approach, there has emerged a "law" of the
conflict of laws, based on the courts' decisions in actual cases, and
resulting from the normal workings of binding precedent and stare
decisis.
I have emphasized that the results did not differ depending on
which "modem" approach to choice of law the courts were purported-
ly following. However, the results reached by the courts in these cases
are generally consistent with the interest analysis approach developed
by the late Brainerd Currie and refined by myself and Currie's other
adherents.38 I maintain that in practice the courts that have abandon-
ed the traditional approach generally apply interest analysis to resolve
choice of law problems regardless of which "modem" approach they
are purportedly following. I further submit that interest analysis is the
preferred approach to choice of law because it facilitates the court's
task of reaching a functionally sound and fair result in the case before
it. It does so because it is based on what in practice seems to the courts
to be the most rational consideration in making choice of law deci-
sions: the policies reflected in a state's rule of substantive law and a
state's interest in applying its law to implement those policies in a par-
ticular case. 3 9
Nonetheless, the focus in the present article is on the choice of law
process rather than on the preferred approach to choice of law. If the
courts are in practice applying interest analysis, it is because the courts
have concluded that this approach facilitates their task in achieving
functionally sound and fair results in particular cases. Their primary
concern, however, has been with the choice of law result in the cases
coming before them for decision and not with the matter of the prefer-
red approach to choice of law. Thus, they have followed judicial
method and the policy-centered conflict of laws in the resolution of
conflicts problems. And this, I maintain, is why they have generally
reached functionally sound and fair results in the cases coming before
them for decision.
II. THE SEXTON-STORIE DECISION
In Sexton-Storie, the Michigan Supreme Court again came to
grips with the fundamental question of whether it was going to con-
38. Currie's writings are collected in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWs (1963). For the author's reformulation of Currie's interest analysis ap-
proach for use by the courts in the day-to-day process of deciding actual cases, see
Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 1, at 220-36. See also Kay, supra
note 1.
39. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference, supra note 1, at 43-44.
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tinue to follow the traditional approach to choice of law in the context
of conflicts torts cases. It had dealt with that question during what
may be called the "first round of the choice of law revolution," 40 and
had opted in favor of adherence to the traditional approach. In
Abendschein v. Farrell,41 decided in 1969, the court concluded that
"the quagmire of unanswered and perceivably unanswerable questions
arising out of the proposed new doctrine appears less attractive than
our admittedly hard and fast - and occasionally unjust, it is true - rule
that the law of the place of the wrong is applied when the forum is a
Michigan court."42
In the years following A bendschein, much happened in regard to
choice of law, not only in the ever-increasing number of states that
had abandoned the traditional approach, 43 but in Michigan as well.
My research disclosed that: "The place of the wrong rule simply has
not been followed consistently by the Michigan Court of Appeals and
by the federal courts in Michigan called upon to apply Michigan con-
flicts law in diversity cases."4 4 Quite to the contrary, these courts,
when they were disposed to do so, 45 employed all of the classic "escape
devices" and "manipulative techniques" 46 in order to avoid the opera-
tion of the place of the wrong rule and to bring about the application
of Michigan law. 4 I concluded that, "[i]n practice, the place of the
40. The "first round of the choice of law revolution" began with Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), and in the wake of
Babcock, a number of courts abandoned the traditional approach. The "second
round of the choice of law revolution" is reflected in the more recent cases, where
courts that had refused to abandon the traditional approach at an earlier time, have
now done so. See Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977);
Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1980); Pevoski v. Pevoski,
371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.
1979). With the Sexton-Storie decision, Michigan becomes the latest state to "go
modem."
41. 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
42. Id. at 516, 170 N.W.2d at 139. For a discussion of the reasons why Abend-
schein may have appeared to the Michigan Supreme Court to be a difficult case at the
time it arose, see Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 8, at 829-30.
43. See supra note 14.
44. Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 8, at 839.
45. The disposition of the Michigan Court of Appeals to avoid the operation of
the place of the wrong rule depended in large part on the composition of the par-
ticular panel deciding the case. Likewise, some federal judges were disposed to avoid
the rule while others were not.
46. For a review of the classic "escape devices" and "manipulative techniques"
see Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 19, at 48-53.
47. See the discussion in Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 8, at
843-47. Some of these cases involved the application of the Michigan borrowing
statute rather than a choice of law question. The borrowing statute, as it then stood,
provided that a suit not barred by limitations under Michigan law could be barred by
the shorter statute of limitations of the "place where theclaim accrued." MIcH. COMP.
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wrong rule has been honored more in the breach than in the obser-
vance," 48 and that because of the necessarily unpredictable behavior
of the courts, "[c]hoice of law in Michigan is in a shambles. 4 9 I con-
tended that:
These developments should persuade the Michigan Supreme
Court to abandon the place of the wrong rule and the tradi-
tional approach to choice of law that it embodies. It is now
time for Michigan to embrace the policy-centered approach to
choice of law, with its emphasis on considerations of policy
and fairness to the parties and on the real interests of the in-
volved states.50
My research into the conflict cases that actually arose in Michigan
after 1969 also disclosed another very important point. Of the nine
cases arising in the Michigan Court of Appeals and the federal courts
in Michigan since A bendschein,5 1 seven involved the identical fact-law
LAWS ANN. § 600.5861(2) (1968) (repealed 1978). Since Michigan followed the place
of the wrong rule, the "place where the claim accrued" meant the state where the acci-
dent occurred. Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 (1975).
When it was disposed to do so, the Michigan Court of Appeals tinkered with the bor-
rowing statute in order to circumvent the time-barring effect of the law of the state
where the accident occurred. See Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 8, at
845-46. The borrowing statute was subsequently amended so as to be inapplicable
when the plaintiff was a Michigan resident. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5861
(Supp. 1981).
48. Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 8, at 840.
49. Id. at 847. In Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625
(1978), the Michigan Supreme Court held that Michigan's "public policy" dictated
that Michigan law apply on the issue of spousal immunity in an Ohio accident involv-
ing Michigan parties. While the court seemingly took pains to make it clear that it was
not using "public policy" as a "munipulative technique," the court specifically refused
to abandon the place of the wrong rule in that case. See the discussion in Sedler,
Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 8, at 853-55.
50. Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 8, at 832. My use of the
term "policy-centered approach" in that writing and other earlier writings was intend-
ed to refer to a choice of law process based on judicial method and the policy-centered
conflict of laws rather than to a particular approach to the resolution of choice of law
issues. In the present writing, I am for the first time distinguishing precisely between
the choice of law process and the approaches to the resolution of choice of law issues.
Thus, for the sake of clarity, I will no longer be using the term, "policy-centered ap-
proach."
51. This includes both the choice of law cases and the borrowing statute cases.
The same fact-law pattern was involved in a case decided by the Michigan Court of
Appeals subsequent to the publication of the article, Shaheen v. Schoenberger, 92
Mich. App. 491, 285 N.W.2d 343 (1979). In Shaheen, Michigan parties were involved
in an accident in Florida, whose law limited the amount of damages recoverable, while
Michigan law did not. Relying on the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Sweeney,
the court of appeals in Shaheen held that Michigan's "public policy" exempted the
elements of damages recoverable from the place of the wrong rule. Id. at 494, 285
N.W.2d at 344.
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pattern, which was also the fact-law pattern in Sexton-Storie: the
plaintiff and defendant were residents of Michigan and were involved
in an accident in another state; under Michigan law, the plaintiffs
were entitled to recover; but if the law of the accident state applied,
recovery would be denied.
This fact-law pattern involves what is the most "universal" rule of
choice of law: when two residents of the forum are involved in an acci-
dent in another state, the forum will apply its own law. 52 The resulting
rule of choice of law embodies the interest solution that where the
forum has a real interest in applying its own law, it should do so.5 3
Thus, where the law of the forum allows recovery, as in Michigan, and
the law of the accident state does not, the classic false conflict is
presented: the parties' home state has a real interest in applying its law
in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, while the policy
reflected in the law of the accident state denying recovery will not be
advanced by its application in the particular case.5 4 Ever since the
seminal case of Babcock v. Jackson,5 5 this fact-law pattern most fre-
quently has furnished the occasion for the courts to abandon the place
of the wrong rule and the traditional approach to choice of law that it
embodies."6
Since this was the fact-law pattern presented in Sexton-Storie, and
was the typical fact-law pattern presented in conflicts torts cases in
Michigan, all the Michigan Supreme Court had to do in Sexton-Storie
was to decide whether Michigan law should be applied or displaced in
this fact-law pattern. It was not necessary for the court, in order to
render a decision, to adopt any particular approach to the resolution
of choice of law issues or to adopt an approach to choice of law at all.
All it had to do was to render a choice of law decision with respect to
the fact-law pattern presented and its decision would resolve the great
majority of conflicts torts cases that had arisen in Michigan.
This is exactly what the Michigan Supreme Court did. It decided
the case solely with reference to the fact-law pattern presented, and it
based its decision on considerations of policy and fairness to the
parties. Its holding was that where the parties to an accident in
another state are Michigan residents or corporations doing business in
Michigan, Michigan law applies. As Chief Justice Williams emphasiz-
ed in his opinion, the decision was rendered "in the normal common-
law tradition, '57 and was limited to the fact-law pattern presented in
52. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 1033-34.
53. Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 1, at 227-30.
54. Id. at 186-87.
55. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1963).
56. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan, supra
note 8, at 830-32.
57. 413 Mich. at 433, 320 N.W.2d at 854.
1204 [Vol. 29:1193
CHOICE OF LA W
that case. The Chief Justice specifically refused to adopt any par-
ticular approach to choice of law, and indicated that the court would
decide how other choice of law issues should be resolved only when
those issues arose in an actual case.- 8
However, in the course of his opinion, the Chief Justice set forth
three major reasons for holding that Michigan law applied in this fact-
law pattern, and these reasons should serve as a guide to the resolution
of the choice of law issue in a case presenting a different fact-law pat-
tern. First, in rejecting the argument that the law of the place of the
wrong should be applied in the Sexton-Storie fact-law pattern on the
ground that the place of the wrong rule avoids "forum shopping," the
Chief Justice noted:
[T]he forum state generally has an interest in seeing that its in-
jured citizens are well-served and that its citizen defendants
are afforded every protection that such citizens would have in
their own state. Additionally, where both the plaintiff and the
defendant are citizens of the forum state, the state where the
wrong took place will normally have no interest in the litiga-
tion.s9
Second, in discussing the cases where the Michigan courts had refused
to apply the place of the wrong rule on "public policy" grounds, 60 he
contended that they stood for the proposition that any legislative
58. Id.
59. Id. Where both the plaintiff and the defendant are Michigan residents,
Michigan is clearly an appropriate forum for the suit. As the Chief Justice observed:
"[A]voidance of forum shopping.., is not a strong argument as against citizens of the
forum state who presumably have every reason of convenience and economy to be en-
titled to service in their own state." Id. at 433, 320 N.W.2d at 854.
60. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978); Shaheen v.
Shoenberger, 92 Mich. App. 491, 285 N.W.2d 343 (1979); Branyan v. Alpena Flying
Serv., 65 Mich. App. 1, 236 N.W.2d 739 (1975) (where Michigan residents flying in an
aircraft owned by a Michigan corporation were killed in an air crash in Virginia,
Michigan's "public policy" precluded limiting the damages recoverable for wrongful
death under Virginia law). The court in Sexton-Storie also discussed its decision in
Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946), where, in
the process of holding that a Michigan statute prohibiting a direct action against an
insurer applied to a suit arising out of an accident in another state, it defined "public
policy" simply in terms of the state's law. As the court in Lieberthal stated: "Public
policy of a state is fixed by its Constitution, its statutory law, and the decisions of its
courts; and when the Legislature enacts a law within the limits of the Constitution; the
enactment insofar as it bears upon the matter of public policy is conclusive." Id. at 40,
26 N.W.2d at 549. What the court did in Lieberthal was simply to equate "public
policy" with "substantive law." This is another way of saying that when a forum has a
real interest in applying its own law in order to implement the policy reflected in that
law, it should do so. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Choice of Law in
Michigan, supra note 8, at 854-55.
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enactment was "a sufficient public policy" to transfer choice of law to
Michigan in cases where Michigan residents were involved. 61 Finally,
he noted that the fact-law pattern presented in Sexton-Storie cited the
"universal" rule of choice law that the law of the forum applies.6 2
Justices Moody and Levin joined in the Chief Justice's opinion.
Justice Kavanagh wrote a brief concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Fitzgerald and also by Justice Levin, which emphasized that the
Michigan owners' liability statutes should be applicable to accidents
occurring in other states where the parties were Michigan residents.6 3
According to Justice Levin, the thrust of the Kavanagh opinion, with
which he agreed, was that in future conflicts torts cases coming before
the Michigan courts, Michigan law should apply absent a
"compelling" reason for applying the law of another state, and the
mere fact that the accident occurred in another state was not a good
reason for displacing Michigan law. 64
61. 413 Mich. at 431, 320 N.W.2d at 853. As noted above, this means that
Michigan law will apply whenever the application of Michigan law will advance the
policy reflected in that law.
62. Id. at 427, 320 N.W.2d at 851.
63.- Id. at 440-41, 320 N.W.2d at 857.
64. Id. at 442, 320 N.W.2d at 858. Justice Ryan and then Chief Justice Cole-
man dissented, contending that Michigan should continue to adhere to the "place of
the wrong" rule. Id. at 443, 320 N.W.2d at 858.
In Sexton-Storie, the court also considered the contention that the Michigan law
should not apply to the instant cases on the ground that the Michigan owners' liability
statutes did not have "extra-territorial application." The court held that the applica-
tion of the owners' liability statutes in the circumstances of those cases did not "result
in an extraterritorial application of Michigan law." Id. at 436, 320 N.W.2d at 855.
The reasoning here was that the legislature was not regulating the tortious conduct of
the operators of the vehicles, but rather was regulating the relationship between the
owner and the operator. Since the relationship between the owner and the operator
was formed in Michigan, there was no extraterritorial application of Michigan law in
imposing statutory liability for an accident arising out of that relationship. Id. at
436-37, 320 N.W.2d at 855-56.
The matter of the application of a Michigan statute to an accident involving
Michigan parties in another state requires some further consideration. Historically,
there was a presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes. This presump-
tion reflected judicial acceptance of the territoriality principle as the basis of
American conflicts law, and that acceptance also underlies the territorially-based rules
of the traditional approach. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Babcock v.
Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 19, at 33-41.
Analytically, the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes is
related to legislative directives as to a statute's applicability, which, of course, are
binding on the courts of the enacting state. When the legislature has specifically pro-
vided that a statute shall be applicable to a particular situation containing a foreign
element, the statute must be applied to that situation by the courts of the enacting
state, totally apart from choice-of-law considerations, assuming that the application of
the statute to that situation is constitutional. Conversely, when the legislature has
specifically provided that the statute shall not be applied to a particular situation con-
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taining a foreign element, it cannot be applied to that situation by the courts of the
enacting state and will not be applied to that situation by the courts of any other state.
For the most part, however, legislatures have not tried to specify the situations con-
taining a foreign element to which a statute does or does not apply. An exception in
this regard is found in the modem "no fault" acts, such as MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 500.3111 (1983), which does specify the act's application to particular situations con-
taining a foreign element.
Even where the legislature has not expressly specified the application or non-
application of a statute to a situation containing a foreign element, it may be deter-
mined that, as a matter of demonstrable legislative intention, the statute was or was
not to apply to such situations. Where the intention of the legislature was that the
statute not apply to a particular situation containing a foreign element, the statute
constitutes what is called a functionally restrictive substantive rule. It cannot be ap-
plied to that situation by the courts of the enacting state and will not be applied to that
situation by the courts of the state where the events occurred. On the subject generally,
see Sedler, Functionally Restrictive Substantive Rules in American Conflicts Law, 50
S. CAL. L. REV. 27 (1976).
This is where the historical presumption against extraterritorial application of
statutes comes into play. In states that recognize that presumption, the presumed in-
tention of the legislature is that the statute not apply extraterritorially to events occur-
ring outside of the enacting state. That presumption can be rebutted only by an ex-
press directive that the statute apply to certain situations occurring outside of the
enacting state or by clear evidence of legislative intention that it so apply. In the
absence of such directive or evidence, the statute will not be applicable. See, e.g.,
Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post, 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969) (Illinois Dram
Shop Act did not apply where service of liquor to intoxicated patron by tavern in Il-
linois caused accident in Wisconsin injuring Illinois resident); Marmon v. Mustang
Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968) (Texas Wrongful Death Act did not apply
to fatal aircrash involving Texas residents and Texas aircraft owner that occurred in
Colorado).
The presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes is not a very
realistic one today. As Chief Justice Williams noted in Sexton-Storie:
As populations and technology progressed and travel between countries and
among the states increased to an everyday occurrence, exceptions to the
general rule of extraterritoriality were created so that it is now recognized
that "a state may have the power to legislate concerning the rights and
obligations of its citizens with regard to transactions occurring beyond its
boundaries."
413 Mich. at 434, 320 N.W.2d at 854 (citations omitted). He went on to point out that
in order to achieve the legislative purpose of the owners' liability statutes, they must be
given uniform application, since to enforce the statute on the basis of where the acci-
dent occurred would undermine the effectiveness of the statutes. Id. at 437-38, 320
N.W.2d at 856.
At this juncture, the Chief Justice related the matter of extraterritorial applica-
tion of the owners' liability statutes to the choice of law holding. Since Michigan law
applied whenever Michigan parties were involved in an accident in another state:
[It would be] anomalous if the injured Michigan party, who could sue the
Michigan driver who was negligent in another state in a Michigan court
under Michigan law, could not sue the Michigan owner whose obligation to
the injured Michigan party arose out of his entrusting his car in Michigan to
a Michigan driver who subsequently injured a Michigan person in that car.
Id. at 438, 320 N.W.2d at 856. Therefore, the ChiefJustice concluded that even if the
owners' liability statutes were being given extraterritorial effect when the owner-
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Let me now relate the holding in Sexton-Storie and the rationale
of the Williams and the Kavanagh-Levin opinions to judicial method
and the policy-centered conflict of laws. It is my submission that the
holding in Sexton-Storie and the rationale of both opinions show that
Michigan has adopted judicial method and the policy-centered con-
flict of laws as the basis of the choice of law process. The first premise
of judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws is that the
basic law is the law of the forum, which will be applied in the absence
of valid reasons for its displacement. That premise is specifically
recognized in the Kavanagh-Levin rationale: in conflicts torts cases
before the Michigan courts, Michigan law should apply absent a
"compelling" reason for applying the law of another state. I do not
think that Chief Justice Williams would disagree with that premise,
and therefore we may assume that it is incorporated into the choice of
law process in Michigan.
The second premise is that the choice of law decision will be made
with reference to the fact-law pattern presented in the particular case.
This premise was specifically recognized in the Williams rationale.
The Chief Justice emphasized that the decision was rendered "in the
normal common law tradition" and that it was not intended to go
beyond the fact-law pattern presented in that case. While the
Kavanagh-Levin rationale went somewhat beyond what was absolutely
necessary for the holding in Sexton-Storie, and tried to establish
guidelines for choice of law decisions in other conflicts torts cases,
Justice Levin emphasized that the court should not attempt to "prog-
nosticate [the] disposition" of questions in other areas of law. 65 The
Kavanagh-Levin rationale did not propose a particular approach to
the resolution of choice of law issues, and under that rationale, choice
of law decisions will still have to be made on a case-by-case basis.
The third premise is that the choice of law decision should be
based on considerations of policy and fairness to the parties. This
premise is supported clearly in both the Williams and the Kavanagh-
Levin rationales. Both rationales focused on the policy reflected in
Michigan law, on the interest of Michigan in applying its law when
Michigan parties were involved in an out-of-state accident, and on the
corresponding absence of any interest on the part of the accident state
in applying its law in such a situation. Justice Levin noted that the
operator relationship arose in Michigan, it would be proper for them to be applied
extraterritorially. Id. at 439, 320 N.W.2d at 856.
It seems clear, in light of the holding and rationale of Sexton-Storie, that the
presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes should no longer operate in
Michigan, and that when the otherwise applicable rule of Michigan law is contained in
a statute, the statute will be applied to events occurring in another state unless the
contrary intention of the legislature is most clearly manifested.
65. Id. at 442, 320 N.W.2d at 858.
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mere fact that an accident occurred in a particular state was not a suf-
ficient reason for applying the law of that state. 66 Both rationales look-
ed to considerations of policy, reflecting the interests of the involved
states in having their law applied on the point in issue, and not to the
factual contacts that the transaction may have had with a particular
state. 67 It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, in light of the holding
in Sexton-Storie, and the rationale of the Williams and Kavanagh-
Levin opinions, that future choice of law decisions in Michigan will be
based on considerations of policy and fairness to the parties. For the
above reasons, it is submitted that Michigan now has adopted judicial
method and the policy-centered conflict of laws as the basis of the
choice of law process.
Neither the Williams nor the Kavanagh-Levin opinion adopted a
particular approach to the resolution of the choice of law issue, a point
that the Chief Justice specifically emphasized. The rationale of the
opinions, however, focuses on the interest of Michigan in applying its
law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law when
Michigan parties are involved in an accident in another state. As I
have demonstrated elsewhere, in practice the courts that have aban-
doned the traditional approach to choice of law generally employ in-
terest analysis to resolve choice of law problems regardless of which
"modern" approach to choice of law they are purportedly following. 68
So, when a court adopts judicial method and the policy-centered con-
flict of laws as the basis of the choice of law process, it can be assumed
that the interest analysis approach will play a very important part in
that court's resolution of choice of law issues.
This is a very important point in regard to the relationship be-
tween the choice of law process and approaches to choice of law.
When a court adopts judicial method and the policy-centered conflict
of laws as the basis of the choice of law process, it need not adopt any
particular approach to the resolution of choice of law issues. But since
the criteria for the choice of law decision under that process are con-
siderations of policy and fairness to the parties, the court inevitably
will take account of the policies reflected in the laws of the involved
states as well as the interest of each state, in light of those policies, in
having its law applied in the particular case. This is because the in-
terest of a state in having its law applied in order to implement the
policy reflected in that law seems to the courts to be the most rational
consideration in making choice of law decisions. So, while a court may
66. Id.
67. There was, of course, no question that the application of Michigan law in
Sexton-Storie was fair to the parties. As a practical matter, questions of fairness to the
parties generally do not arise in conflicts torts cases. See supra note 37.
68. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Governmental Interest Ap-
proach, supra note 1, at 227-33.
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not specifically adopt the interest analysis approach to choice of law,
and while it may in fact adopt a different "modem" approach to
choice of law, experience indicates that the results reached by the
courts in the cases coming before them for decision are generally con-
sistent with the interest analysis approach. 69 Thus, whenever a court
commits itself to judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of
laws as the basis of the choice of law process, its decisions in actual
cases are likely to be based to a substantial extent on a consideration of
the policies reflected in the laws of the involved states, and the in-
terests of each state, in light of those policies, in having its law applied
in the particular case.
Now that Michigan is committed to judicial method and the
policy-centered conflict of laws as the basis of the choice of law
process, we would likewise expect the choice of law result in a par-
ticular case to be consistent with interest analysis. In the absence of
contrary indications by the Michigan Supreme Court, therefore, we
may assume that the primary factor in the choice of law decision will
be the court's evaluation of the policies reflected in the laws of the in-
volved states, and the interest of each state, in light of those policies,
in having its law applied in the particular case.
A few years back, I undertook a reformulation of the interest
analysis approach, as originally developed by the late Brainerd Currie,
for the purpose of facilitating its use by the courts in the process of
deciding actual cases.70 This reformulation focuses on the real in-
terests of the forum and the other involved state, 7' and establishes
three interest situations and solutions. First, when the forum has a real
interest in applying its own law on the point in issue, it should do so,
assuming that this will not be fundamentally unfair to the other
party.7 2 Second, where the forum does not have a real interest in ap-
plying its own law on the point in issue, but another state has such an
interest, it should apply the law of the other state, again assuming no
fundamental unfairness. 73 Third, when neither state has a real interest
in applying its law on the point in issue, the choice of law decision
should be made with reference to the common policies reflected in the
69. It is also true that when the forum has a real interest in applying its own
law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, it will generally do so, as
Currie and Ives advocate. Id. at 227-33.
70. Id. at 220-36.
71. In determining whether a state has a real interest in the application of its
law on the point in issue, the inquiry is whether the policy behind the state's rule of law
will be significantly advanced by its application to the particular situation containing a
foreign element. For a discussion of determining real interests, see id. at 222-27.
72. This covers what Currie calls the true conflict and the false conflict where
the forum is the only interested state. See id. at 186-87, 188-89.
73. This covers the false conflict where the forum is the disinterested state.
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other laws of the involved states. 74 These interest solutions are to a
large extent embodied in the tort rules of choice of law that have
emerged from the courts' decisions in actual cases. 75
How the Michigan courts will resolve cases presenting these dif-
ferent interest situations can only be determined when such cases
actually arise. The fact-law pattern presented in Sexton-Storie only in-
volved one aspect of the first interest situation: the case where
Michigan had a real interest in having its law applied, and the other
involved state did not. My solution to the first interest situation,
however, also covers the "true conflict" case, where both Michigan
and the other involved state have a real interest in having their law ap-
plied in the particular case. This point illustrates the difference be-
tween a court's adopting a particular approach to choice of law, such
as interest analysis, as opposed to a court's adopting judicial method
and the policy-centered conflict of laws as the basis of the choice of
law process without at the same time adopting any particular ap-
proach to choice of law. In Sexton-Storie, the court held only that
Michigan law would apply in the fact-law pattern presented in that
case and did not, by adopting a particular approach to choice of law,
try to control the result in a case that had not yet arisen.7 6
To sum up, in Sexton-Storie, the Michigan Supreme Court
adopted judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws as
the basis of the choice of law process in Michigan. It did not adopt any
particular approach to choice of law, although as pointed out above,
experience indicates that whenever a court adopts judicial method
and the policy-centered conflict of laws as the basis of the choice of
law process, the interest analysis approach will play a very important
part in the court's resolution of choice of law issues. The rationale for
the holding in Sexton-Storie, as contained in both the Williams and
Kavanagh-Levin opinions, illustrates judicial reliance on interest
analysis to resolve choice of law questions. The decision in Sexton-
Stoie, however, was limited to the fact-law pattern presented in that
case, and the holding is simply that Michigan law applies whenever
two Michigan parties are involved in an accident in another state. The
question of what law will be applicable in other fact-law patterns will
only be decided as cases involving those fact-law patterns actually
74. This covers the unprovided-for case. For a discussion of the common policy
rationale for the resolution of the unprovided-for case, see id. at 233-36. See also the
discussion in Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided for Case: Reflections on
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HoFsTRA L. REv. 125, 137-42 (1973).
75. As illustrated by the rules of choice of law themselves. See Sedler, Rules of
Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 1032-41.
76. For a discussion of the experience of New York, which has tried to
"govern" choice of law in interstate accident cases by the promulgation of narrow,
policy-based rules, see id. at 983-94.
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arise. This is as it should be under judicial method and the policy-
centered conflict of laws.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHOICE OF LAW IN CONFLICTS
TORTS CASES IN MICHIGAN
We will now consider some other fact-law patterns that have been
presented in other conflicts torts cases and try to predict how they
would be decided by the Michigan Supreme Court today. In accord-
ance with judicial method, we will do so in light of the holding in
Sexton-Storie and the rationale of the Williams and Kavanagh-Levin
opinions. Looking to the fact-law patterns presented in cases previous-
ly arising in Michigan, let us first reconsider A bendschein t;. Farrell."'
Under the particular facts of that case, both New York (the plaintiffs
home state) and Michigan (the defendant's home state) would allow
recovery-New York, because it did not have a guest statute, and
Michigan, because the defendant assumedly was guilty of gross
negligence and so would still be liable under the then-extant Michigan
guest statute.7" Ontario, where the accident occurred, would have no
interest in applying its guest statute to enable a Michigan defendant to
avoid liability to a New York plaintiff. Thus, there was no conflict be-
tween Michigan law and New York law on the point in issue, and New
York had a real interest in applying its law to allow recovery.
In terms of interest analysis, the case presents a false conflict. The
rule of choice of law in such a situation is that whenever two parties
from recovery states, without regard to forum residence, are involved
in an accident in a nonrecovery state, recovery will be allowed.7 9 Func-
tionally, this case is no different from Sexton-Storie, since recovery is
allowed by the law of the parties' home states, and the accident state
has no interest in having its law applied to deny recovery. Sexton-
Stone would control the result in A bendschein, and recovery would be
allowed.
Now let us consider the situation where the plaintiff is from
Michigan, the law of which allows recovery, the defendant is from a
nonrecovery state, and the accident occurs in the defendant's home
state. Suit is brought in Michigan, where jurisdiction can be exercised
on the basis of the defendant's contacts with this state. This situation
was presented in Papizzo v. 0. Robertson Transport, Ltd. ,80 where a
77. 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
78. See Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 8, at 836.
79. See Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 1034. The result is the
same whenever parties from the same recovery state are involved in an accident in a
non-recovery state, and suit is brought in the non-recovery state. See, e.g., Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
80. 401 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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Michigan victim was killed in Ontario due to the negligence of an
Ontario defendant, which was doing business in Michigan. Under
Michigan law, recovery was allowed in a wrongful death action for
various intangible interests, such as loss of companionship; under
Ontario law it was not. The Michigan federal court used the
manipulative technique of "procedural characterization" to apply
Michigan law as the "law of the forum" on this issue. In so doing, it
emphasized Michigan's interest in applying its law allowing greater
recovery and the absence of unfairness to the defendant in the ap-
plication of Michigan law on this issue."'
In terms of interest analysis, this fact-law pattern presents what
Currie calls the true conflict, or as I would put it, the situation where
both of the involved states have a real interest in having their law ap-
plied on the point in issue. Michigan has a real interest in applying its
law to allow full recovery to the beneficiaries of a Michigan decedent,
while Ontario has a real interest in having its law applied to limit the
liability of an Ontario defendant.8 2 In such a situation, Currie and I
maintain that the forum should apply its own law to implement its
own policies and interests.8 3 There is obviously no unfairness to the
Ontario defendant in the application of Michigan law on this issue,
since the defendant did not "rely" on Ontario law limiting the
elements of damages recoverable for wrongful death before becoming
involved in the fatal accident. Where a plaintiff from a recovery state
is injured or killed by a defendant from a nonrecovery state in the
defendant's home state, and suit can be brought in the plaintiffs
home state, the majority of the courts passing on the question have
held that the forum should apply its own law allowing recovery.8 4
Michigan law clearly would be applicable here under the rationale
of the Kavanagh-Levin opinion in Sexton-Storie. It was this kind of
case to which Justice Levin presumably was referring when he stated
that Michigan law should apply in all personal injury and property
damage cases in Michigan, "without regard to whether the plaintiffs
and defendants are all Michigan persons unless there is compelling
reason for applying the law of some other jurisdiction. "85 Since
81. Id. at 543.
82. In the accident situation, the real interests lie in the parties' home states,
because the consequences of the accident and of allowing or denying liability will be
felt by the parties in the home state. The interest calculus thus is not affected by the
place where the accident occurs.
83. See the discussion in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note
1, at 227-30.
84. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 1036-37.
85. 413 Mich. at 442, 320 N.W.2d at 858. Justice Levin apparently takes the
position that where the defendant does business in Michigan, the defendant is a
Michigan "resident" for choice of law purposes, and says that where the defendant is a
Michigan resident, "ordinarily there will be insufficient reason for applying the law of
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Michigan has a real interest in applying its law here in order to imple-
ment the policy reflected in that law, there most certainly would not
be a "compellihg reason" for applying Ontario law,8 6 and it seems
clear that Michigan law would be applicable under the Kavanagh-
Levin rationale.
I also think that Michigan law would be applicable here under the
Williams rationale. The Chief Justice emphasized Michigan's interest
in applying its law on the point in issue in Sexton-Storie and its con-
cern for advancing Michigan's policy in conflicts cases, as illustrated
by the cases where the courts had refused to apply the place of the
wrong rule on "public policy" grounds. 87 Those reasons indicate that
whenever Michigan has a real interest in having its law applied in
order to implement the policy reflected in its law, Michigan law
should apply, notwithstanding that another state may also have a real
interest. Should a case like Papizzo or any other "true conflict" case
arise in Michigan, I think it is highly likely that the Michigan Supreme
Court would hold that Michigan law should apply.88
Now let us consider the "reverse Sexton-Storie" situation. Two
another state." Id. at 441, 320 N.W.2d at 857. However, where the defendant is incor-
porated or has its principal place of business in another state, that state would be in-
terested in applying its law to shield that defendant from liability. This case,
therefore, is not identical to Sexton-Storie. My submission is that since Michigan's in-
terest is the same in both cases, Michigan should apply its own law notwithstanding
the existence of an interest in another state in the latter case. See Sedler, Governmen-
tal Interest Approach, supra note 1, at 227-30.
A case presenting this fact-law pattern could also arise in Michigan even where
the defendant had no connection with Michigan. This would occur where the trans-
action giving rise to the accident was factually connected with Michigan, so as to make
it constitutionally permissible for Michigan to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of
forum-transaction contacts. Suppose that an Ontario driver comes to Michigan, takes
a Michigan passenger on a trip to Ontario, intending to return to Michigan that even-
ing, and an accident occurs while the parties are traveling in Ontario. Because of the
factual contacts that the transaction giving rise to the accident had with Michigan,
Michigan could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction on the basis of forum-transaction
contacts regardless of whether the accident itself occurred in Ontario or Michigan. In
the event that the defendant asserted the Ontario guest statute to bar recovery, a true
conflict would be presented, and again, I would submit that Michigan should apply its
own law. See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
86. As Currie has observed:
The sensible and clearly constitutional thing for any court to do, confronted
with a true conflict of interests, is to apply its own law. In this way it can be
sure at least that it is consistently advancing the policy of its own state. It
should apply its own law ... simply because a court should never apply any
other law except when there is a good reason for doing so. That so doing will
promote the interests of a foreign state at the expense of the interests of the
forum state is not a good reason.
B. CuRIuE, supra note 38, at 119.
87. Papizzo fits into this category. See supra note 60.
88. For the above reasons, lower state courts and Michigan federal courts
should so hold if and when they are presented with such a case.
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residents of Ontario, traveling in the same automobile in Michigan,
are involved in an accident in Michigan. Suit is brought in Michigan
under the tort long-arm act, and the defendant asserts the defense of
guest statute immunity in accordance with Ontario law.89 Ontario, of
course, has a real interest in applying its law on this issue, since the
defendant is an Ontario resident, and the accident will be charged to
the insurer's Ontario loss experience. Here, because the accident oc-
curred in Michigan, Michigan could assert a general interest in apply-
ing its law to allow recovery: the plaintiff might become a public
charge in Michigan if recovery is not permitted or may have incurred
debts to resident medical creditors which could only be satisfied from
the proceeds of tort recovery. 90 It has also been contended that the
compensatory policy of the state of injury should be applied in favor of
all persons injured within its borders.9 '
In my view, this general interest in allowing recovery is quite in-
substantial, and cannot justify the application of the law of the acci-
dent state to defeat the strong defendant-protecting policy reflected in
the law of the parties' home state. In this day and age, the accident
victim will get back home, and the social and economic consequences
of the accident and of imposing or denying liability will be felt by the
parties in the home state. The purpose of tort recovery is not to pro-
vide reimbursement for medical creditors, since medical loss forms
such a small part of the total recovery. The only real interest here lies
with the parties' home state, Ontario, and its law should be applied to
deny recovery.92 In this fact-law pattern, the courts are divided, but
the majority view is that the forum should apply its own law allowing
recovery.93 I strongly disagree with this view and maintain that it
simply reflects the forum's preference for what it considers to be its
own "better law." 94
89. The Ontario plaintiff would not sue in Ontario, because if suit had been
brought there, Ontario would apply its own law and deny recovery. The Canadian
courts follow the "English rule" in tort cases, under which tort liability cannot be im-
posed if it would not be imposed under the law of the forum. See McLean v. Pet-
tigrew, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65. In this country, whenever non-recovery state parties are
involved in an accident in a recovery state, and suit is brought in the parties' home
state, assuming that state has abandoned the traditional approach, it will apply its
own law and deny recovery. See, e.g., Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968);
DeFoor v. Lematta, 249 Or. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968). This being so, the plaintiff will
always bring suit in the accident state, obtaining jurisdiction under its long-arm act.
90. See B. CURRIE, supra note 38, at 366-72.
91. See D. CAVERS, supra note 5, at 143-45.
92. See the discussion in Sedler, Judicial Method is "Alive and Well": The
Kentucky Approach to Choice of Law in Interstate Automobile Accidents, supra note
19, at 382-83.
93. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 1035.
94. In some of these cases, the "better law" rationale has been specifically ad-
vanced for the application of the forum's own law allowing recovery. See Gagne v.
Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624 (1972); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157
N.W.2d 579 (1968).
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I think that Ontario law would be held applicable here under the
rationale of the Williams opinion in Sexton-Stone. As Justice Williams
noted, where both the plaintiff and the defendant are from the same
state, that state "generally has an interest in seeing that ... its citizen
defendants are afforded every protection that such citizens would have
in their own state,"95 and the state where the wrong took place will
normally have no interest in the litigation.96 Since in this case, the
social and economic consequences of the accident and of imposing or
denying liability will be felt by the parties in Ontario, the rationale
relied on by Justice Williams to hold Michigan law applicable in
Sexton-Storie would dictate that Ontario law should apply in this
"reverse" situation.
As regards the Kavanagh-Levin rationale, the question would be
whether the fact that both parties were from Ontario was a "compell-
ing reason" for applying Ontario law in preference to Michigan law.
Because of the insubstantiality of Michigan's interest in applying its
law to allow recovery in comparison with the interest of Ontario, the
parties' home state, in applying its law to deny recovery, there would
be a "compelling reason" to displace Michigan law in this case. While
it cannot be said for certain how the Michigan Supreme Court would
resolve the choice of law issue in this situation-unless and until it is
presented in an actual case-my reading of the rationale of the
Williams and Kavanagh-Levin opinions in Sexton-Storie indicates that
the displacement of Michigan law here would be fully consistent with
that rationale.
The final situation we may consider is, what in terms of interest
analysis is called, the unprovided-for case: the defendant is from a
state that imposes liability while the plaintiff is from a state that does
not. Suppose that a Michigan host driver and an Ontario guest
passenger are involved in an accident in Ontario. In a suit brought by
the Ontario passenger against the Michigan driver in Michigan, the
driver asserts the defense of guest statute immunity, which is
recognized under Ontario law, but not under Michigan law. As we
have said, in the ordinary accident case, the states where the parties
reside are the states that have a real interest in having their law ap-
plied irrespective of where the accident occurred, since the social and
economic consequences of the accident and of imposing or denying
liability will be felt by the parties in their home state. But here,
because the law of the plaintiff s home state would deny recovery while
the law of the defendant's home state would allow recovery, neither
state has a real interest in having its law applied on the point in issue.
While interest analysis can identify the unprovided-for case, it cannot
95. 413 Mich. at 433, 320 N.W.2d at 854.
96. Id.
1216 [Vol. 29:1193
CHOICE OF LA W
as such provide the means for its resolution.9 7
In this fact-law pattern, the suit is usually brought in the defend-
ant's home state, 98 and the courts have generally allowed recovery,
both where the accident occurs in the defendant's home state and
where it occurs in the plaintiffs home state.9 9 One basis of allowing
recovery has been that due to the absence of a real interest in either
state in having its law applied on the point in issue, the law of the
forum allowing recovery should be applied, since there is no good
reason for displacing that law.100 Another basis of allowing recovery,
which I have developed, is the common policy rationale. 101 Although
neither state has a real interest in having its law applied on the point
in issue, a functionally sound solution to the unprovided-for case can
be found by looking to the common policy of the involved states.
Usually the point as to which the laws of the involved states differ in-
volves a substantive rule that is an exception to the common policy
reflected in what may be called the general law of both states. Since
the state whose law represents an exception to the common policy of
both states has no interest in having its law applied in the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, the common policy should come to
the fore and the exception should not be recognized. 0 2
In our guest statute example, all states allow recovery for
negligence resulting from an automobile accident, but some, such as
Ontario, make an exception when the victim is a passenger in the
host's automobile by requiring a showing of a higher degree of
negligence in that circumstance.103 The only state interested in allow-
97. See the discussion in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note
1, at 233-34.
98. Presumably, plaintiffs counsel chooses to bring suit in the defendant's
home state on the very realistic assumption that it is easier to persuade a court to apply
its own law than it is to persuade a court to displace its own law in favor of the applica-
tion of the law of another state.
99. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 1038. The only exception
appears to be New York, which holds that where, as here, the parties are from dif-
ferent states, the law of the state where the accident occurs applies. So, the result in
the unprovided-for case would depend on whether the accident occurred in the plain-
tiff's home state or in the defendant's home state. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31
N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
100. See Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
101. See Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973).
102. See the discussion in Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note
1, at 235-36.
103. The most realistic policy behind a rule providing guest statute immunity is
to protect the insurer from collusive suits. Other legitimate policies behind such a rule
could be to protect the host from suits by ungrateful guests or to protect the insurers by
removing this category of cases from the scope of their liability. Assuming that the rule
of guest statute immunity reflects all of these policies, the only state interested in ap-
plying its law on this issue is the defendant's home state, where the vehicle is insured.
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ing that exception to the general policy of liability for negligence is the
defendant's home state, since the consequences of imposing liability
will be felt by the defendant and the insurer in that state. But when
the law of the defendant's home state does not allow this exception,
the common policy in favor of recovery should prevail. In our exam-
ple, therefore, Michigan should apply its own law on the issue of
guest-host immunity and deny the defense.
The result in this fact-law pattern is clearly indicated by the
Kavanagh-Levin rationale. Michigan law, as the law of the forum,
should apply, because there is no "compelling reason" to displace
Michigan law.104 Little guidance is given to the resolution of this fact-
law pattern in the Williams rationale. This is because the Chief Justice
stressed the interest of the parties' home states in having their law ap-
plied in an accident case, and here neither party's home state is in-
terested in having its law applied on the point in issue. However, Chief
Justice Williams did make reference to the practice of other states in
resolving the choice of law issue presented in particular fact-law pat-
terns- what I have called the rules of choice of law that have emerged
from the courts' decisions in conflicts torts cases. 0 5 It might be rele-
vant under the Williams rationale that in this fact-law pattern
recovery generally has been allowed. Again, my prediction here is that
the Michigan Supreme Court would hold that Michigan law applied in
this fact-law pattern. The application of Michigan law would clearly
follow under the Kavanagh-Levin rationale and would not be inconsis-
tent with the Williams rationale.
In the preceding discussion we have tried to predict how the
Michigan Supreme Court might decide other fact-law patterns that
could be presented in conflicts torts cases. We have tried to do so in
light of the holding in Sexton-Storie and the rationale of the Williams
and Kavanagh-Levin opinions. Cases presenting all of the fact-law
patterns we have discussed may not arise, and in Sexton-Storie the
Michigan Supreme Court did not try to develop an approach to choice
of law that was designed to resolve cases that had not yet arisen and
that might never arise. If and when cases presenting the different fact-
law patterns do arise, the court will decide them, as Justice Williams
noted, "in the normal common-law tradition."'1 s Such case-by-case
adjudication is the essence of judicial method and the policy-centered
conflict of laws, which is now the basis of the choice of law process in
Michigan.
104. This was the rationale given by the court in Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454,
506 P.2d 494 (1973).
105. 413 Mich. at 427, 320 N.W.2d at 851.
106. Id. at 433, 320 N.W.2d at 854.
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IV. CHOICE OF LAW IN MICHIGAN:
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
As stated above, choice of law in Michigan will develop through
case-by-case adjudication, and the choice of law decision will be
rendered with reference to the fact-law pattern presented in the par-
ticular case. 0 7 Until such time as a sufficient number of cases have
been resolved by the Michigan Supreme Court, so that a "law" of the
conflict of laws has emerged in Michigan, the lower courts and federal
courts in diversity cases will have to resolve particular cases in light of
the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Sexton-Storie and the
rationale of the Williams and Kavanagh-Levin opinions. Typical of
how these courts must approach conflicts cases is the recent decision of
the Michigan Court of Appeals in Smith v. Pierpont.0 s That case in-
volved a malpractice action resulting from a vasectomy performed by
the defendant, a Michigan physician, on the plaintiff, a Michigan
resident, at one of the defendant's offices across the state line in
Wisconsin.'"° Wisconsin law required that malpractice claims be sub-
mitted to mediation, and the defendant moved that the plaintiffs suit
in Michigan be dismissed for failure to submit the claim to mediation.
The defendant argued for the application of Wisconsin law on the
basis of the place of the wrong rule. The court of appeals held that
Michigan law applied, and reversed the trial court's order of
dismissal." 0
The court of appeals reviewed the rationale of the Williams and
Kavanagh-Levin opinions in Sexton-Stoie and concluded that the
position of the supreme court was that the law of the place of the
107. Justice Levin noted that the court should not [and did not] attempt to
"prognosticate" the disposition of choice of law issues presented outside of the tort
area, aid took the position that the rules of the traditional approach-such as that the
validity of a contract is determined by the law of the place where the contract was
made-continued in effect and were binding on the lower courts. Id. at 442-43, 320
N.W.2d at 858. Neither the opinion of Chief Justice Williams nor the opinion of
Justice Kavanagh discussed this point. With all due respect to Justice Levin, I would
submit that the choice of law process that the court adopted in Sexton-Storie-which
has as its basis judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws-constitutes
the court's abandonment of the traditional approach and, as far as the lower courts
are concerned, analytically leaves open the resolution of choice of law issues in other
areas of law. As to choice of law in Michigan in conflicts contracts cases, see Sedler,
Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 8, at 848 n.107.
108. 123 Mich. App. 33, 333 N.W.2d 165 (1983).
109. Many conflicts cases, such as this one, arise in functional multistate areas,
where the state line, although legally real, is of no practical significance in the day-to-
day lives of the people living in that area. On the subject generally, see Sedler, The
Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9
DuQ. L. REV. 394 (1971).
110. 123 Mich. App. at 38, 333 N.W.2d at 168.
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wrong would not be applied solely because the accident occurred in
that state.' The court of appeals said that it favored the Kavanagh-
Levin rationale, and said that there was a "presumption" in favor of
the law of the forum in tort cases." 2 In holding that Michigan law ap-
plied in the instant case, the court stated:
All parties are residents of Michigan, and a state has a signifi-
cant interest in applying its own substantive law to its citizens.
On the other hand, we find no superior Wisconsin interest in
having its substantive law applied, especially since the injury
did not affect any Wisconsin residents or property.'1
Smith v. Pierpont presented the same fact-law pattern as that
presented in Sexton-Storie: the plaintiff and defendant were both
residents of Michigan and the harm occurred in another state. The
factual situation in Smith, however, was somewhat different from the
factual situation in Sexton-Storie where the defendant's sole contact
with the accident state was the accident itself. In Smith v. Pierpont,
the injury arose from a medical procedure performed in a state whose
law required mediation of malpractice disputes. It could be contended
that Wisconsin has an interest in requiring mediation whenever the
alleged malpractice was committed in Wisconsin by a physician hav-
ing an office there.
As the court of appeals correctly observed, however, Michigan's
interest is the same whenever both the plaintiff and the defendant are
Michigan residents, and the primary factor calling for the application
of Michigan law in Sexton-Storie, under both the Williams and
Kavanagh-Levin rationales, was Michigan's strong interest in applying
its own law whenever both of the parties were Michigan residents.
Since the fact-law pattern presented in Smith was the same as the fact-
law pattern presented in Sexton-Storie, Michigan's interest in having
its law applied was the same in both instances. Thus, the reasons call-
ing for the application of Michigan law in Sexton-Storie likewise called
for the application of Michigan law in Smith. So, whenever both par-
ties to a tort action arising in another state are Michigan residents,
Michigan law applies regardless of the nature of the tort, and
regardless of the issue as to which the laws of Michigan and the other
involved state differ. The holding of Sexton-Stoie was that Michigan
law applies when both parties to a tort action arising in another state
are Michigan residents, and that holding controlled the result in
111. Id. at 36, 333 N.W.2d at 167.
112. Id. at 38, 333 N.W.2d at 168.
113. Id.
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Smith, notwithstanding the different factual situation presented in
that case.1
4
Smith illustrates the operation of judicial method and the policy-
centered conflict of laws in practice. Since that case presented the
same fact-law pattern as that presented in Sexton-Storie, the holding
in Sexton-Stoie controlled, and Michigan law was applied. As cases
presenting other fact-law patterns arise, the Michigan courts will
resolve those cases with reference to the fact-law pattern presented in
the particular case and on the basis of considerations of policy and
fairness to the parties.
In my earlier study of conflicts law in Michigan, I concluded that,
"[c]hoice of law in Michigan is in a shambles."'1 5 With the decision in
Sexton-Stoie and the adoption of judicial method and the policy-
centered conflict of laws as the basis of the choice of law process in
Michigan, we begin a new era in choice of law. I would confidently
predict that in Michigan, as elsewhere, the courts now will achieve
functionally sound and fair results in the conflicts cases coming before
them for decision.
114. Cases presenting the same fact-law pattern generally are decided the same
way by a court notwithstanding a difference in the factual situation. For example, in
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), where
New York parties were involved in an accident in Ontario, a guest statute state, the
trip originated in New York and was to end there. In Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569,
249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), New York parties were involved in an acci-
dent in Michigan, then a guest statute state. In Tooker, however, the driver and the
passenger were students at Michigan State University, and the accident occurred on a
trip from East Lansing to Detroit. Since the fact-law pattern was the same in both
Tooker and Babcock, New York law was held to apply on the issue of guest-host im-
munity.
115. Seder, Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 8, at 847.
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